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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3730 
 ___________ 
 
 EDDIE LAREECE PITTMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOB, Night Forman; JAMES AUSTIN CO. 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-00842) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 5, 2013 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  April 5, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Eddie LaReece Pittman appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing 
his complaint.  We will affirm.   
I. 
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 Pittman was employed for four weeks by James Austin Company (“JAC”) until, 
for reasons that Pittman has not specified, it told the employment agency that placed him 
that his services were no longer required.  Pittman filed suit pro se against JAC and one 
of its employees, identified only as a foreman named Bob, asserting Title VII claims for 
quid-pro-quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.  Pittman’s claims were based 
on three incidents in which he alleges that Bob:  (1) asked him “you alright?” as he was 
going on break; (2) stood in an “uncomfortable” proximity to Pittman while performing a 
job; and (3) after summoning other employees to help Pittman with a task, placed his 
hands on Pittman’s shoulders and said “You’re lucky I like you . . . I like you because 
you’re so big.”  Pittman further alleged that another employee later told him that Bob is 
homosexual and had a history of “getting too close” to other male employees.  The return 
of service for Bob states that he was not served with the complaint because he is 
deceased, and Pittman’s suit thus proceeded solely against JAC. 
 JAC filed an initial motion to dismiss the complaint, but the District Court deemed 
Pittman’s response an amendment of his complaint and denied the motion as moot.  The 
District Court later granted JAC’s second motion and dismissed Pittman’s complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court held that Pittman failed to state a claim for either 
quid-pro-quo or hostile environment harassment and that further amendment of those 
claims would be futile.  The District Court also dismissed Pittman’s potential claims 
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) for the same reason, but it 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any other potential state-law claims.  
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Pittman appeals pro se.
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II. 
 The District Court concluded that Pittman failed to state a claim for quid-pro-quo 
harassment because, inter alia, he did not plead anything suggesting a nexus between his 
response to Bob’s allegedly sexual advances and any decision affecting a term of his 
employment.  See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2000).  
The District Court concluded that Pittman failed to state a claim for hostile environment 
harassment because, inter alia, a reasonable person would not find Bob’s alleged conduct 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of employment or create an abusive 
environment.  See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).  Pittman argues 
that the District Court misapplied the law and that his allegations adequately state a 
claim.  Having reviewed the matter de novo, however, we disagree for the reasons stated 
by the District Court.  In essence, Pittman alleges merely innocuous conduct that bore no 
relation to any term or condition of his employment.  For the same reasons, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that further amendment would be futile.   
 Finally, although Pittman does not challenge the District Court’s handling of his 
potential state-law claims, we perceive no abuse of discretion in that regard.  In 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 
F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  In doing so, we construe the complaint’s factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and ask whether they plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.  See id. at 220-21.  We review for abuse of discretion the 
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appropriate cases, district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some state-
law claims but not others.  See Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1999).  In this case, the District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
Pittman’s potential PHRA claims because, as the District Court correctly noted, those 
claims are governed by the same legal standard that applies to his federal Title VII 
claims.  See Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  That rationale does not apply to state-law claims of a different kind. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
District Courts’ dismissal without leave to amend, see id. at 220, and its exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction, see Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). 
